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Abstract. The public funds have become a major source of finance for clusters in the last 
decade, also in European countries. The source of financing clusters and innovation per-
formance of the countries is directly connected to subjects of the national/regional cluster 
policy, i.e. to its centralisation. The paper examines the relationship between European 
country attitude towards financial support provided for cluster and country innovative per-
formance in a sample of 125 clusters from 25 European countries. The own empirical in-
vestigation is based on primary research using the Kruskal-Wallis test and Mann-Whitney 
tests with Bonferroni. The investigation is focused on facts whether statistically significant 
differences in the amount of subsidies from national, regional, local and “European” levels 
between clusters in European countries influence their level of innovation performance. 
The finding shows that there are no statistically significant differences in the exploitation 
of resources from the Structural Funds and community programmes of the EU in the ex-
amined clusters in the countries with different levels of innovation performance. However, 
the clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance receive funds in 
the form of central government and regional self-government subsidies more frequently 
than the clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance. 
Keywords: clusters, cluster policies, financing clusters, public funds, innovation perfor-
mance, European countries.
JEL Classification: O31, O38, R58.
Introduction
According to a number of studies, public funds have become a major source of finance 
for clusters in the last decade, in the European countries in particular; however, also in 
Japan, South Korea or the USA (Barsoumian et al. 2011; Meier zu Köcker 2009; Ox-
ford Research AS 2008; Borrás, Tsagdis 2008; OECD 2007; Sölvell et al. 2003). The 
approach of European countries towards financial support provided for clusters and to-
wards the amount of such support varies from country to country. Besides, the countries 
tend to perceive differently where the support to clusters should come from – whether 
from the national or regional/local public sources, or possibly from the Structural Funds 
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and community programmes of the European Union. Therefore the main objective of the 
article is to study differences in amount of subsidies from national, regional, local and 
“European” levels between clusters in European countries and to investigate, whether 
the financing of clusters from the closer territorial level (regional, national) is in a posi-
tive relation to country innovation performance. 
1. Theoretical framework and previous empirical findings 
The respected measure for a country’s innovation performance is provided by the Sum-
mary Innovation Index (European Commission 2013) reflecting the input and output 
indicators of research, development, innovation, entrepreneurship and intellectual prop-
erty. Clusters as a geographic concentration of interconnected companies and institu-
tions have become an important object of the innovation policy financial interventions 
(Ketels 2015; Uyarra, Ramlogan 2012). Two processes forming the extent of cluster 
policy regionalisation are in progress in Europe nowadays: the downward decentralis-
ing process and a parallel process aiming at higher internationalisation and international 
cooperation (Borrás, Tsagdis 2008). The greater extent of internationalisation and inter-
national cooperation is frequently viewed as a key element of cluster policy and clusters 
are regarded as an effective tool for promoting international cooperation, productivity 
and innovation – all these are closely related to growing competitiveness of national 
and international markets. 
Cluster policy follows present global development trends towards strengthening the 
decentralisation of power and responsibility to lower state and public administration 
levels and the authority of regional and local institutions (Kaklauskas et al. 2009). The 
extent of centralisation may significantly influence the dynamics of cluster processes 
in a country. In countries with a higher centralisation of public institutions including 
their decision-making authority, the national level of cluster support dominates over the 
regional or local ones. Nonetheless, a cluster policy always requires at least partial de-
centralisation of the decision-making processes. In most cases the level of centralisation 
is affected by the concentration of funds at the national level (Andersson et al. 2004). 
The role of national government is still fundamental to many economies. A centralised 
cluster policy effort is aimed at gaining a competitive advantage at a local or regional 
level; however, with the central coordination of processes from the government. Funds 
are also allocated almost entirely from the national level. One of the common forms of 
intervention at the governmental level is financial aid provided to the private sector in 
the form of state subsidies. France and Norway are held up as instances of a centralised 
cluster policy in Europe. 
A decentralised cluster policy is typical for regions with the strong awareness of a 
regional identity shared by the regional government and its citizens. Therefore, the 
cluster policy is a part of the broader process of decentralisation of regional policy. De-
centralised cluster policies are typical in the case of regions in Austria, Italy and Spain. 
A cluster feedback policy is a mixed policy that is pursued across different levels of 
country management. Mostly, it is the national level that creates the basic framework for 
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a cluster policy in a country and enables the lower levels to initiate, create and imple-
ment individual cluster policies. Sweden and the UK are typical examples of the cluster 
feedback policy implementation (Raines 2001). 
Belgium belongs to the countries with the most decentralised cluster policy in Europe, 
where each of the three regions follows its own cluster policy, whereas there is no 
cluster policy at national level. On the contrary, a country with a high centralisation of 
cluster policies at the national level is France. The cluster policy has been pursued at 
the regional level since the beginning of the 1990’s and since 2006 there has also been 
implemented a national cluster policy. Some other countries, such as Netherlands, have 
established a national cluster policy framework but with regional authorities assisting 
partially in the policy implementation (Barsoumian et al. 2011). The system applied in 
the Netherlands corresponds partly to a cluster support strategy that relies on centralisa-
tion and coordination of cluster programmes at the national level if it is ensured that the 
process support takes place at the lower levels. To foster the development of clusters, 
funds should be allocated from a local level without the necessity of constantly requiring 
the approval of the national authorities (Andersson et al. 2004). 
Many of empirical studies have dealt with regionalisation of cluster policies in the last 
five years (Barsoumian et al. 2011; Meier zu Köcker 2009; Oxford Research AS 2008; 
OECD 2007). Ireland, Israel, Norway and Portugal are the countries attaching greater 
importance to national policies; unlike Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy and Spain 
(Oxford Research AS 2008). According to another study, a cluster policy is implemented 
primarily at the national level in most European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Slovenia). The regional level in sup-
porting cluster policies dominates only in Austria, Belgium and Denmark (Barsoumian 
et al. 2011). At the same time, all the mentioned studies point to the high amount of 
support offered to cluster policies, evenly distributed between the national and regional 
levels in the countries with a high level of innovation performance, such as Germany, 
Sweden and Great Britain. Several studies also agree on a shortage of public funds for 
clusters operating in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance through 
national, regional or local subsidies (Oxford Research AS 2008; OECD 2007; Ketels 
et al. 2006; CLOE 2006). 
Many of the countries try to make up this deficit by raising funds from the Struc-
tural Funds and community programmes of the European Union. European funds as 
a regional development policy tool focus on reducing regional disparities between the 
wealthiest and poorest EU member countries and regions. Less developed countries 
and regions also show lower levels of innovation performance (Ginevičius, Podvezko 
2009). The clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance are 
eligible to receive subsidies for their activities from the national and/or regional pub-
lic sources. However, countries with lower levels of innovation performance (Poland, 
Hungary and Bulgaria) regard the Structural Funds as an essential financial source for 
cluster innovation and research and development (Urbančíková, Burger 2010; Bialic-
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Davendra, Pavelková 2011). Similarly, the Structural Funds play a significant role in 
cluster support in the Czech Republic (Skokan, Zotyková 2014; Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce of the Czech Republic 2010), Slovakia (Ministry of Economy of the 
Slovak Republic 2011) and Lithuania. 
2. Methodology and hypotheses
The own empirical investigation is based on extensive primary research. A survey was 
carried out during the years 2011 and 2012. In total 834 clusters from the European 
countries were addressed and a total of 125 cluster representatives properly responded 
to the questionnaires. The overall response rate was 14.99%. Primarily the facilitators of 
the clusters were interviewed. The majority of responses were received from the cluster 
representatives in the Czech Republic (17), Germany and Slovakia (14), Hungary (12), 
Sweden (8), Denmark (7) and Spain (6). Four responses came from the cluster represen-
tatives in Austria, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Switzerland and the UK respectively. 
Three responses were obtained from Netherlands and Lithuania and the other European 
countries delivered only maximum two responses. 
Public funds for clusters may be allocated from different government levels. The re-
cent research studies (Rothgang et al. 2015; Lindqvist, Sölvell 2011; Barsoumian et al. 
2011; Sölvell 2009; Pavelková et al. 2009) have served as the basis for the creation of 
a suitable method of classifying cluster financing within the system of public funds as 
follows:
1. National budgets (national/governmental funds to finance cluster activities); 
2. Regional budgets (regional funds to finance cluster activities); 
3. Local budgets (municipal funds to support cluster activities); 
4. European Union budgets (funding cluster activities from the EU funds). 
The same options for answers have been used in the survey. The cluster managers 
were asked to mark the approximate structure of the income part of the cluster annual 
budget from the external sources. The aim of the article is then to investigate statisti-
cally significant differences in the amount of subsidies from national, regional, local 
and “European” levels between clusters in European countries; and if shares of the 
various forms of subsidies in clusters’ budgets differ according to country innovation 
performance. The theoretical framework and previous empirical studies analysed lead 
to testing the following hypotheses: 
H1: Clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance have a larger 
share of national and regional subsidies in their budgets than those in the countries 
with lower levels of innovation performance.
H2: Clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance have a larger 
share of the Structural Funds and community programmes of the European Union 
in their budgets, than those in the countries with higher levels of innovation per-
formance.
The former hypotheses require a certain classification system to determine the inno-
vation performance of a particular country. The source used for such determination/
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evaluation is the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2013 and the main classification tool 
known as the Summary Innovation Index (European Commission 2013). With respect 
to this index, European countries are divided into four groups- innovation leaders (Swe-
den, Germany, Denmark and Finland), innovation followers (Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, the UK, Austria, Ireland, France, Slovenia, Cyprus and Estonia), moderate 
innovators (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Greece, Slovakia, Hungary, Malta 
and Lithuania) and modest innovators (Poland, Latvia, Romania and Bulgaria). In com-
parison to the previous year evaluation, only two changes in “EU Member States’ inno-
vation performance” occurred. Lithuania advanced to the group of moderate innovators 
and Poland moved down becoming a modest innovator. It should be however noted, 
that the change in performance group was due to marginal changes of the innovation 
performance in both cases. In this research, the first two groups (innovation leaders, in-
novation followers) are considered to be the countries with a higher level of innovation 
performance, the third and fourth groups (moderate innovators, modest innovators) are 
defined as the countries with a lower level of innovation performance. In both selected 
samples, there are a sufficient number of statistical units – 51 clusters (40.80%) with 
a higher level and 74 clusters (59.20%) with a lower level of innovation performance 
what makes the independent samples representative and thus enables the generalizations 
of the statements via hypothesis testing.
The empirical research leads to testing the clusters with different innovation perfor-
mance using Kruskal-Wallis test and pair comparisons using Mann-Whitney tests with 
Bonferroni correction to determine whether the equality of the share of public funds 
in various groups of countries is related to their innovation performance. The Kruskal-
Wallis test is considered as non-parametric alternative to the single-factor analysis of 
variance. It compares medians of more than two independent populations providing 
that the conditions for the use of classical parametric analysis of variance are not met. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test requires neither the fulfilment of the condition for statistical 
homogeneity of variance nor the normality of distribution. If the null hypothesis is re-
jected, there is a difference between at least of one the pairs of medians (Sheskin 2007; 
Hudec et al. 2007). After the rejection of the null hypothesis in the Kruskal-Wallis test, 
a post-hoc test is performed – the Mann-Whitney test with Bonferroni inequality cor-
rection. The Mann-Whitney U-test belongs to more powerful non-parametric tests. To 
minimise type II errors, the level of significance is corrected with Bonferroni correction 
(Monroe 2006). 
3. Allocation of public funds to cluster budgets
The allocation of public funds to the budgets of clusters in the countries divided accord-
ing to their level of innovation performance varies from one cluster group to another. 
The most balanced shares are seen in the clusters of innovation leader countries, as can 
be seen in Figure 1. Concerning the structure of funds, the Structural Funds and com-
munity programmes of the EU and subsidies from the central government are dominant 
in this group of clusters. Subsidies from local self-government present the lowest share. 
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There is a high share of regional self-government subsidies in the budgets of innova-
tion followers, as can be seen in Figure 2. This might be due to the presence of several 
Austrian clusters in the examined sample as regional self-government is one of the key 
driving forces in the Austrian cluster policy. On the contrary, the percentage share of 
subsidies from the central government is lower than in the case of clusters in the coun-
tries of innovation leaders. 
As shown by the primary research results in Figure 3, it is possible to see the dominance 
of funds from the Structural Funds and community programmes of the EU in the cluster 
budgets in the countries of moderate innovators. There are minor differences between 
subsidies of various types – central state subsidies, regional and local self-government 
subsidies – when considering their shares in the cluster budgets.
When assessing the percentage of public funds in the cluster budgets in the countries 
of the modest innovators, it is necessary to take into account the low quantity of clus-
Fig. 1. Percentage of public funds shares in the cluster budgets in the countries  
of innovation leaders
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ters responding to the survey in this group. In total there were eleven clusters in the 
group; however, even such a small sample proved that the clusters in the countries of 
the weakest innovators have rare opportunities to gain finance for their activities from 
the national, regional and local levels, as can be seen in Figure 4. They can raise public 
funds for their activities only when succeeding in gaining some resources from the 
Structural Funds and community programmes of the European Union. 
4. Comparison of shares of various kinds of public funds in cluster budgets 
When comparing the share of various kinds of public funds (Structural Funds and com-
munity programmes of the European Union, central government subsidies, and regional 
and local self-government subsidies) in cluster budgets, the presence of statistically 
significant differences between clusters operating in countries with different levels of 
innovation performance was detected. In the process of examination of the proposed 
Fig. 3. Percentage of public funds in the cluster budgets in the countries  
of moderate innovators
Fig. 4. Percentage of public funds in the cluster budgets in the countries  
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hypotheses – whether the clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation per-
formance benefit from higher shares of national and regional subsidies in their budgets 
and vice versa, the clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance 
benefit more from the resources allocated from the Structural Funds and community 
programmes of the EU – the following results were found and summarized in Table 1.
Kruskal-Wallis test
H0: µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ4
                                            H1: non H0 
Table 1. Comparison of shares of the Structural Funds and community programmes of the 
European Union, central government subsidies, regional self-government subsidies and local 
self-government subsidies in annual cluster budgets in various groups of countries
Division of clusters 
according to the innovation 
performance of the 






Minimum level  
of significance for 
the rejection of the 
null hypothesis
Comparison of 






Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 57.04
p-value 0.130
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 54.26
Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 65.25
Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 82.05
Total 125
0.130 > 0.05 H0 is not rejected (the differences in comparing the shares of the Structural Funds 
and community programmes of the European Union in cluster budgets in various groups of 
countries are not statistically significant; therefore, it is not necessary to compare their pairs, 
i.e. to perform the Mann-Whitney paired-sample test with Bonferroni inequality correction)
Comparison of 







Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 78.93
p-value 0.000
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 74.74
Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 54.39
Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 44.95
Total 125
0.000 < 0.05 H0 is rejected (the differences in comparing the shares of the central government 
subsidies in cluster budgets in various groups of countries are statistically significant; therefore, 
it is necessary to compare their pairs, i.e. to perform the Mann-Whitney paired-sample test with 
Bonferroni inequality correction) 
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Division of clusters 
according to the innovation 
performance of the 






Minimum level  
of significance for 
the rejection of the 
null hypothesis
Comparison 






Clusters in the countries of 
innovation leaders 34 62.57
p-value 0.002
Clusters in the countries of 
innovation followers 17 85.35
Clusters in the countries of 
moderate innovators 63 60.33
Clusters in the countries of 
the modest innovators 11 44.00
Total 125
0.002 < 0.05 H0 is rejected (the differences in comparing the shares of the regional self-
government subsidies in cluster budgets in various groups of countries are statistically significant; 
therefore, it is necessary to compare their pairs, i.e. to perform the Mann-Whitney paired-
sample test with Bonferroni inequality correction)
Comparison of 




and towns) in 
annual cluster 
budgets 
Clusters in the countries of 
innovation leaders 34 65.04
p-value 0.084
Clusters in the countries of 
innovation followers 17 76.97
Clusters in the countries of 
moderate innovators 63 59.83
Clusters in the countries of 
the modest innovators 11 57.95
Total 125
0.084 > 0.05 H0 is not rejected (the differences in comparing the shares of local self-government 
subsidies (municipalities and towns) in cluster budgets in various groups of countries are not 
statistically significant; therefore, it is not necessary to compare their pairs, i.e. to perform the 
Mann-Whitney paired-sample test with Bonferroni inequality correction)
Source: Self-processed (based on the IBM SPSS Statistics outputs).
The Kruskal-Wallis test shows there is a greater share of resources from the Structural 
Funds and community programmes of the EU in the budgets of the clusters in the coun-
tries of the modest and moderate innovators. All groups of clusters, however, regardless 
of the innovation performance of the country of residence of the cluster, benefit from 
this kind of resource to a great extent. This accounts for the fact that when comparing 
the shares of the Structural Funds and community programmes of the EU in the cluster 
budgets, the differences between the individual groups of countries with varying levels 
of innovation performance are not statistically significant. 
End of Table 1
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When comparing the shares of various types of subsidies in the cluster budgets – central 
government subsidies or regional or local self-government subsidies, statistically signifi-
cant differences were identified. Therefore, it was reasonable to compare their pairs, i.e. 
to determine the groups of countries between which statistically significant differences 
occur. Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction were used for pair comparisons. 
The results from the comparisons are shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction 
H0 : µ1 = µ2 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ2
H0 : µ1 = µ3 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ3
H0 : µ1 = µ4 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ4
H0 : µ2 = µ3 
H1 : µ2 ≠ µ3
H0 : µ2 = µ4 
H1 : µ2 ≠ µ4
H0 : µ3 = µ4 
H1 : µ3 ≠ µ4
Table 2. Pair comparisons of shares of central government subsidies (governments, ministries) 
in annual cluster budgets in various groups of countries
Division of clusters according 
to the innovation performance 






Minimum level of 
significance for the 
rejection of the null 
hypothesis 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 27.12
p-value 0.431Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 23.76
Total 51
0.431 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 61.04
p-value 0.000Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 42.50
Total 97
0,000 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 25.76
p-value 0.006Clusters in the countries of the 
modest innovators 11 14.45
Total 45
0.006 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 51.65
p-value 0.006Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 37.49
Total 80
0.006 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference 
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Pair comparisons of shares of central government subsidies have confirmed that clusters 
in the countries of innovation leaders and innovation followers, i.e. the clusters in the 
countries with higher levels of innovation performance gain statistically significantly 
larger shares of national funds than the clusters in the countries of moderate and modest 
innovators, i.e. the clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovative performance. 
The greatest share of funds at the national level comes to the budgets of the clusters in 
the countries of innovation leaders. The clusters in the countries of innovation followers 
also greatly use the funds allocated in the form of state subsidies. On the other hand, 
the clusters in the countries of moderate and modest innovators only rarely benefit from 
such funds. This is frequently reflected in their lower competitiveness. 
Mann-Whitney tests with Bonferroni correction 
H0 : µ1 = µ2 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ2
H0 : µ1 = µ3 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ3
H0 : µ1 = µ4 
H1 : µ1 ≠ µ4
H0 : µ2 = µ3 
H1 : µ2 ≠ µ3
H0 : µ2 = µ4 
H1 : µ2 ≠ µ4
H0 : µ3 = µ4 
H1 : µ3 ≠ µ4
Discrepancies between the groups of clusters in pair comparisons of shares of subsidies 
from regional levels are not as large as those at the national level. Despite this, it is 
mainly the clusters in the countries of innovation followers that have high shares of 
funds from the regional levels. On the contrary, the clusters in the countries with lower 
levels of innovation performance either do not benefit from regional subsidies at all 
(the clusters in the countries of the modest innovators) or receive only very negligible 
amounts of funds from regional levels (the clusters in the countries of moderate inno-
vators). No statistically significant differences were recorded in comparisons of shares 
of regional self-government subsidies in the cluster budgets in the countries of innova-
Division of clusters according 
to the innovation performance 






Minimum level of 
significance for the 
rejection of the null 
hypothesis 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 17.82
p-value 0.007Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 9.64
Total 28
0.007 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference 
Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 38.40
p-value 0.254Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 32.36
Total 74
0.254 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Source: Self-processed based on the IBM SPSS Statistics outputs.
End of Table 2
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Table 3. Pair comparisons of shares of regional self-government subsidies in cluster budgets  
in various groups of countries
Division of clusters according 
to the innovation performance 






Minimum level of 
significance for the 
rejection of the null 
hypothesis 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 22.79
p-value 0.013Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 32.41
Total 51
0.013 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation leaders 34 49.82
p-value 0.894Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 47.68
Total 97
0.894 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Clusters in the countries 
of innovation leaders 34 24.46
p-value 0.061Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 18.50
Total 45
0.061 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 52.88
p-value 0.004Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 37.16
Total 80
0.004 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference 
Clusters in the countries  
of innovation followers 17 18.06
p-value 0.001Clusters in the countries  
of the modest innovators 11 9.00
Total 28
0.001 < 0.00833 H0 is rejected: significant difference
Clusters in the countries  
of moderate innovators 63 39.07
p-value 0.045Clusters in the countries of the 
modest innovators 11 28.50
Total 74
0.045 > 0.00833 H0 is not rejected 
Source: Self-processed based on the IBM SPSS Statistics outputs.
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tion leaders and the countries of the moderate and modest innovators. Nevertheless, 
statistically significant differences were observed in comparisons of shares of regional 
self-government subsidies among the clusters in the countries of innovation followers 
and the countries of the moderate and modest innovators. 
5. Assessment of the proposed hypotheses 
Hypothesis No. 1 is assuming greater shares of state and regional subsidies allocated to 
clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance and this hypoth-
esis is found to be true. 
When comparing the shares of central government subsidies in annual cluster budgets 
between the clusters in the countries of innovation leaders and innovation followers, 
and the clusters in the countries of the moderate and modest innovators, statistically 
significant differences were indicated in all four mutual pair comparisons in the relevant 
indicator. 
In the examination of shares of regional self-government subsidies in cluster budgets, 
smaller differences were detected among the individual groups of clusters than in the 
previous case. Equally (as in the shares of national subsidies), statistically significant 
differences were found among the clusters in the countries of innovation followers 
and the countries of the moderate and modest innovators. There were no statistically 
significant differences among the clusters in the countries of innovation leaders and the 
clusters in the countries of the moderate and modest innovators in regional subsidies. 
Despite this, it may be concluded that Hypothesis No. 1 is plausible. The hypothesis 
clarifies the mutual relation between the innovation performance and financing clusters 
from the closer territorial level (regional, national). This can be explained by generally 
higher budgets of regional and national administration in the countries of innovation 
leaders and more developed regional innovation systems. Also, closer management of 
financial support usually means better knowledge of context, monitoring and cluster 
performance supporting the devolutionist principle of subsidiarity. 
On the contrary, Hypothesis No. 2 is shown only partially true. Although the clusters in 
the countries with lower levels of innovation performance use slightly greater amounts 
of finance from the Structural Funds and community programmes of the European 
Union than the clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance, 
such differences are not statistically significant. This is because all groups of clusters, 
regardless of the innovation performance of the residing countries, obtain substantial 
(at least 30 percent) funding from the Structural Funds and community programmes of 
the European Union. The Structural Funds are considered as an additional source of 
financing, but in the less innovation performing countries this source is often exclusive 
for financing cluster activities, what makes the development of the clusters dependent 
on the actual EU settings of goals and not corresponding to cluster needs. The financial 
vulnerability is a high risk of a cluster survival. Low innovation performance goes hand 
in hand with a lack of accessible, flowing and well-tailored finance. 
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Conclusions 
The amount of financial support for clusters from public funds differs greatly in the Eu-
ropean countries. While there are no statistically significant differences in the examined 
clusters in the countries with different levels of innovation performance in the exploita-
tion of resources from the Structural Funds and community programmes of the EU, the 
clusters in the countries with higher levels of innovation performance receive funds in 
the form of central government and regional self-government subsidies more frequently 
than the clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance. The main 
reason is that the clusters in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance 
face a complicated problem to receive subsidies and are forced to resort solely to col-
lecting relatively high membership fees from the cluster members. As a result, the lack 
of the financial resources of subsidies prevents them from setting and fulfilling ambi-
tious goals that could have a positive impact on the level of regional competitiveness. 
Moreover, limited resources may lead to problems with co-financing national or interna-
tional projects. At the same time, higher membership fees in the clusters in the countries 
with lower innovation performance (resulting from the lack of subsidies) cause tensions 
within most clusters and increase pressure (particularly from the highest contributing 
companies) on their facilitators. A weak point of cluster financing in less innovative 
countries is not only a lack of finance, in general, but moreover a lack finance from 
regional or country public sources and too centralised financing, against the subsidiarity 
principle. In other words, the closer finance is supposed to be spent more efficiently. 
The competitiveness of the clusters in the countries with a higher level of innovation 
performance, in the case they are partly subsidised, is high and bears out the appro-
priateness of cluster policies in these countries (Ketels 2013). The representatives at a 
national or regional level in Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria or Denmark have 
come to a conclusion that providing subsidies to clusters is an appropriate manner of 
enhancing their competitiveness and thereby enhancing the competitiveness of munici-
palities or regions where clusters exist. There is a reason to assume that more generous 
funding to clusters in the less performing countries in innovation would be a sensible 
use of the public finances. Hence, the national or regional level in these countries would 
not run the risk of the public resources being mismanaged or wasted as some clusters 
in the countries with lower levels of innovation performance have repeatedly proved 
a certain level of their competitiveness even without the help of public funding, and 
without subsidies in particular. In conclusion, it can be expected that potential support 
for clusters could help both the clusters and the whole industry or region where they 
operate. 
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